The above observations about state funding are unfortunately accurate. But there is some good news.
If we can use the Kyle years as a model, the railroad was able to generate enough revenue to pay its operating expenses and provide a modest amount of money for winter locomotive overhauls and track work. So the need for state money was limited to "capital" needs which often allow some flexibility as to when the money is spent. Even private enterprises often delay capital expenditures based on cash flow and income managment.
Which leaves three problems. One, ridership has deteriorated and costs have gone up, so the Kyle model no longer works. Two, you cannot delay needed capital expenditures forever. And three, the railroad has physically deteriorated badly from the Kyle days and needs a certain amount of capital expediture NOW.
The reasons for ridership decline are debatable, but my suggestion would be a return to daily service from both ends and a year or two of big time advertising to let the world know the railroad is really there and offers a great ride. All that takes is money and marketing skill. But it might make the Kyle model work again. Which I think is important because I question the political acceptability of permanent operating subsidies. Capital subsidies sound more acceptable, at least to me.
The states need to appropriate a bunch of money for at least the next year to start the process of getting the railroad out of the hole. In the short run there are operating deficits to cover, critical capital needs like major track work, and that big advertising campaign to pay for.
The theory would be that after a year or two of big spending, the state subsidy can maybe go back to the more discretionary capital stuff. But that is admittedly an optimistic scenario.
This digging out of a hole stuff is no fun.
JBW
